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1 Introduction 
MONIT – Monitoring and implementing horizontal innovation policy – is a cross-national 
and comparative OECD-project aimed at strengthening the knowledge for development of and 
implementing of a horizontal innovation policy. MONIT is focused on studies of co-
ordination, coherence and policy learning within and between institutional arrangements for 
innovation policy, directed at generating knowledge for the OECD countries on how to 
improve innovation policy governance and create a more coherent innovation policy. In 
addition to Norway, 12 other countries participate in the MONIT network. 
 
STEP is in MONIT studying the Norwegian innovation policy system through several inter-
linked studies. A main focus is to better understand the underlying logic of the Norwegian 
system, its roots in terms of cultural traditions and the main priorities coming out of it. Both 
mapping studies and more detailed studies of parts of the innovation policy system are 
therefore needed.  
 
This is a study of the Research Council of Norway (Norges Forskningsråd). The Research 
Council of Norway (RCN) is interesting to study in MONIT because of its central position in 
the Norwegian innovation policy system. RCN bears overall responsibility for national 
research strategy, and manages nearly one third of public sector research funding. The 
Council identifies important fields of research, allocates funds and evaluates R&D, and one of 
the principal tasks is to promote cooperation and coordination among Norwegian research 
institutions. It is also called upon to offer strategic advice to the Government on science and 
technology issues. 
 
Moreover, RCN has just been reorganized, and it is therefore useful to take into consideration 
what these changes in the institutional arrangements might mean for the innovation policy in 
Norway. In MONIT we are particularly interested in whether the “old” organisation model of 
RCN had co-ordination failures that this new institutional arrangement might solve.  
 
The main focus of our study has therefore been to gather information on how the “old” model 
functioned, and thereafter to make some considerations of what the new institutional 
arrangement of RCN might mean for the innovation policy in Norway. 
 
This study is to a great extent based on existing documentation on RCN, for example the 
evaluation of the RCN done by the Technopolis in 2001 published in the main report: A 
Singular Council, Evaluation of the Research Council of Norway and its 16 background 
reports. In addition we have built on the experiences and work done by STEP in the EU-
Trendchart project1, GoodNip-project2 and other relevant studies on the innovation policy 
system, as well as interviews. 
                                                 
1 http://www.trendchart.org
2 http://www.step.no/goodnip/
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2 An ambitious reform 
2.1 A recent history of RCN3
 
The phenomenon of research councils; separating funding from research, first came into being 
immediately after the Second World War. The Norwegian Research Council for Scientific and 
Industrial research (NTNF), under the Ministry of Trade and Industry (NHD), and the 
Norwegian Research Council for Agriculture (NLVF), under the Ministry of Agriculture (LD) 
was established in 1946. In 1949 a council for basic research was set up: the Norwegian 
Research Council for Science and the Humanities (NAVF). NAVF was organized in four sub-
councils: medical, natural science, social science and humanities. 
 
The council system was lively debated in the post-war period; the tasks and roles of the 
existing institutions, proposals to create new research councils and the co-ordination and co-
operation between the different councils. New sub-councils were established and reorganized. 
The universities were not content with their position under NAVF; they wanted to become 
more active in determining their own research policy. And, a series of committees on 
governmental level were put in place to advice on research policy. 
 
In 1970 a proposal was put forward to establish a single research council, but was turned 
down due to its “centralist” character. However, a need for a reform in the research council 
structure was repeated several times during the 1980s. The need for ‘strategic agencies’ was 
emphasized, with the capacity of mediating between the political and the institutional level. 
The relationship was handled through the ‘Langslet doctrine’ in the early 1980s, bringing in 
the principle of distance between ministries and research. The ministries roles were to define 
research budgets and not buy research needed to support policy development directly. 
  
Norwegian research had a growth period in the latter half of the 1980s. Public funds for 
research were originally channeled through four “growth areas” which became nine so-called 
‘main target areas’ (hovedinnsatsområder)4. These were cross-disciplinary and cross-sectoral 
fields, which involved several ministries and research councils. A complex organisation with 
national committees for strategy development, co-operation and co-ordination was set up to 
cope with their cross-disciplinary nature. 
 
In 1990 the Grøholt committee was set up to examine the research council structure. They 
reported in 1991 that there should be a single research council, organised in three strategic 
disciplinary councils; for life sciences, physical sciences and technology and culture and 
social science. The members of these Disciplinary Boards and the Executive Board should be 
appointed by the government, and the Ministry of education were to take over responsibility 
for the core funding from the other ministries. The sector principle would in that way be 
modified, and make room for a national research strategy. There should be a better integration 
of basic and applied research and a professionalized research management. Research councils 
should be central, neutral managers of interests, and research policy advice and 
                                                 
3 This chapter is based chapter 4 in Technopolis report: A Singular Council, Evaluation of the Research Council 
of Norway (2001). 
4 The nine ‘main target areas’ were biotechnology, fishing and aquaculture (Havbruk), Health, environment and 
the quality of life (HEMIL), Information technology (IT), Culture and research on the preservartion and 
communication of traditions (KULT), Management and organisation (LOS), Oil and gas, Material technology, 
Environmental technology. 
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implementation should be more clearly separated in a re-establishment of the research policy 
council (Forskningspolitisk råd). 
There was agreement on the general lines of the Grøholt report, but conflict on the divisional 
organisation. In February 1992 the major research ministries had reached a compromise upon 
the new research council; constituting in the six sub divisions (områdestyrer) that became the 
1993-organisationmodel: 
• The Bio-production and Processing Division (BF) 
• The Culture and Society Division (KS) 
• The Environment and Development Division (MU) 
• The Industry and Energy Division (IE) 
• The Medicine and Health Division (MH) 
• The Science and Technology Division (NT) 
 
The government had some other proposals than the Grøholt committee regarding the 
institutional model. A white paper in June 1992 said that the Government should appoint the 
Executive Board, but that the Executive Board it self should appoint divisional boards. The 
Government was also of the opinion that the research policy council was not necessary, this 
should be a part of the tasks of the new research council. The White Paper emphasised in 
particular the unified nature of the council with the unified organisation of the council’s 
administration. RCN was formally established on the first of January 1993. 
 
2.2. A vulnerable process: RCN comes into being 
There therefore no easily traceable link between the proposal by the committee and what 
came out of the process as the end result. In fact, it is unclear what the committee actually 
proposed. This is evident from the following statement from one of the committee members: 
 
“The basic idea in the proposal by the committee was that there should be three 
research councils. To be better able to distribute resources between the three councils, 
based on a certain degree of scientific competence, and to ensure awareness of areas 
falling between them, there was at the last moment proposed an umbrella organisation. 
The result, however, was one council, far more integrated than what the Grøholt 
committee had proposed. Whether this was caused by misreading of the committee 
proposal or simply that the political bodies had a very different view than the 
committee, I do not know.”5
 
More insight into this process is gained from the text in box 1, which links the proposal and 
the government decision with the Standing committee in Parliament. This committee felt 
uncertainty as to the proper policy to be chosen, and as a result became victim to this 
uncertainty, partly due to its own traditional lack of insight in research policy matters. 
 
 
 
                                                 
5 Interview with prof. Francis Sejersted, member of the Grøholt committee, Forskningspolitikk 2/2001, 
Forskningsfondet: Nytenkning må til. 
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Box 1: RCN in the political process6
 
A White Paper was submitted to Parliament in May 1992. Initially, the Standing Committee on 
Education, Research and Church Affairs in Parliament did not see the Government proposal as 
an obvious road to follow. It was hesitant about discussing the White Paper at the end of a 
hectic spring term immediately prior to the summer recess. Actually, the Government had 
presented the White Paper after the normal deadline for such matters in the spring session and 
postponing it was not far-fetched. 
 
The Standing Committee made a preliminary decision to postpone the matter to the autumn 
term. They also had in mind to study the R&D organisation in the other Nordic countries before 
reaching a decision. The possibility of delay led to great disappointment as much activity 
among the supporters of the reform inside and outside of government. They argued that the 
research councils should not be in limbo much longer. More importantly, they feared that the 
opposition to the merger might gain momentum. However, some key actors outside the 
Parliament managed to make the Chairman change his mind on the timing. 
 
Most of the Committee members soon came to the conclusion that for them it was a matter of 
“taking or leaving” the entire reorganisation package. It was so much of a fragile compromise 
that it could easily fall apart if even minor changes were introduced. 
 
The result was that the bill passed the Standing Committee without any major cleavages or 
changes; the entire Committee except its Progressive Party members (right wing liberalists) 
supported the Government proposal. However, the Committee stated that all resources to the 
new council should be channelled through the Ministry of Education and Research. This was a 
significant, but somewhat naïve point of view, given the existing financial structure, practice 
and ministerial attachments to he existing funding and existing research councils. For example, 
the Ministry of Industry channelled the greater part of its funds for R&D through NTNF; 
Parliament’s view would have revolutionised R&D funding in Norway. The Committee also 
stated that all staff members in the former councils should be offered jobs in the new council. 
Accordingly, the new organisation started off without much new blood.  
 
Another point made by Skoie should be added. The White Paper was drafted carefully, almost 
strategically, and gave room for different interpretations on important points. The text was 
vague, and critical considerations were left out. It was basically a compromise paper 
representing a commonality of the positions taken by the research councils and the relevant 
ministries and “attuned to parliamentary politics”.  Further, states Skoie, “… its supporters 
accepted the merger at a very abstract and general level; during the process many of the 
qualifications they set for accepting it de facto evaporated – they could not at all be met.” 
(ibid).  
 
A stunning fact is also that while such a reform needs “lubricants” to get off to a good start, 
typically with sufficient funding, the availability of financial resources declined severely over 
the next years, challenging both the outside legitimacy as well as the internal functioning of 
the council (see more below). 
                                                 
6 From Hans Skoie: Diversity and Identity: The Merger of Five Research Councils in Norway. Science and 
Public Policy Vol. 27, no. 2 pp 83-96, April 2000. 
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3. Governance and co-ordination 
3.1. The policy function and the problem of political abdication from R&D 
policy 
The research council set up from 1993 had, as mentioned, several contradictions that were 
mainly structural. A salient feature of RCN and the new all-encompassing model was a 
combination of a classic, albeit highly integrated, research council, whose main function was 
to implement policy through funding operations, with a policy function. In fact, the RCN was 
expected by the minister of Science and Education to perform a key science policy advisory 
role.  
 
RCN never played the role foreseen. In addition to arguing for increased budgets for R&D 
and providing strategic plans for its own mission (impossible), activities that should be 
expected anyway (Skoie 2000), no major initiative for long term policy development and 
prioritization was taken. Meetings were held between the council and the Standing Committee 
of Science and education. “However, these meetings do not seem to have been particularly 
successful, and the number of attending ministries has varied considerably. It is noteworthy 
that criticism of the lack of vigorous advice and engagement from the Council has come from 
the Government itself” (ibid: 91). 
 
A wider assessment of this seems needed. First, it seems natural that a new council like RCN, 
meeting with demanding and multiple expectations from the environment, puts the finger on 
the scar left over from the start up phase: A significant reduction in funding that on the one 
hand led to infighting for resources and on the other hand to recurrent demands vis a vis its 
owners for appropriate funding. The lack of funding in the years after this reform is clearly a 
policy or government failure leading to years of set-backs of the overall innovation system. 
Second, the inability of the council in performing its policy advisory role may be linked to a 
vacuum of interest and capability in the political system. The Standing Committee of Science 
and Education in the Parliament was always an educational committee, and members had 
little if any competence and interest in science or research policy. Still, they were the 
committee to deal with the R&D budget, while R&D policy and budgets were never dealt 
with in the committee that had the long term interest in the area from an innovation policy 
point of view, namely the Standing Committee of Trade and Industry. It is therefore fair to 
conclude that the capability failure in the RCN to perform was and is mirrored by the lack of 
capability, competence and interest in the political system as well as a structural failure of 
attention in that system.  
 
 
3.2. Organisational set-up on the 1993-model of RCN7
The 1993-model of RCN had three organisational levels. The Executive Board (hovedstyre) 
was effectively appointed by the government, had overall responsibility for RCN strategy and 
                                                 
7 This section is based on a summary of the Technopolis report: A Singular Council, Evaluation of the Research 
Council of Norway (2001) presented in European Trend Chart on Innovation. Theme-specific Country Report: 
Norway, March 2002. 
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represented it externally. It proposed RCN’s overall strategy and budgets to The Ministry of 
Education and Research. It looked after ‘horizontal’ questions such as international 
cooperation and large equipment procurement, set budgets and approved divisional strategies, 
but delegated responsibility for different disciplines and operative responsibility for research 
to the six divisions. 
 
Each division had a divisional board (områdestyre), appointed by the Executive Board. While 
both researchers and users of research had to be represented, the Executive Board decided on 
the appropriate balance, which can vary from division to division. The divisional board was 
responsible for initiating, planning, funding, monitoring, evaluating and disseminating results 
from research in its area, within guidelines set by the Executive Board and the external 
funders of research. It was supposed to maintain close contact both with researchers and with 
the ministries, which finance the work. 
 
The ‘third steering level’ in RCN comprised programme boards (programstyrer) with 
delegated power to allocate funds to projects, and advisory committees for academic 
disciplines and matter, which advise the division board on project priorities but do not 
themselves make decisions. The composition of committees at this level was determined more 
by user interests than by scientific criteria. 
 
The organisation of RCN represented to a great extent a systemic contradiction. On the one 
hand RCN was expected to enhance policy co-ordination through merging previously 
independent research councils, and hence co-ordinate through integration of the agency level 
(a centrifugal effect).  On the other hand RCN was organised with a strong divisional 
structure, including the divisional boards. They developed their own R&D policy agenda, 
even to the detrimental effect of neutralising the strategy division of RCN, one with the over 
all responsibility of developing a coherent strategy and provide the government with policy 
advise as discussed above.  
 
3.3 Internal functioning of RCN 
The organisational set-up implied some ambitious objectives8. The RCN was established in 1993 
in order to improve the coordination between funding of basic and applied research, the 
coordination between the different sectors and disciplines, and to develop and coordinate 
national research policy. However, the formation of a unified Council in 1993 has not been 
accompanied by a similar rationalization within the structure of the Ministries or within the 
structure of the research community itself (although the sheer dominance of SINTEF, a 
research institute representing some 60% of the institute sectors turnover alludes to the high 
level of concentration in an otherwise disparate sector).  
 
Historically, sectoral ministries channelled funds for infrastructure and research through 
sectoral research councils, which in turn allocated these funds to sectoral research institutes. 
This situation remained unchanged after the reform, except that the sectoral research councils 
have been turned into sectoral ‘divisions’ within a unified council. 
 
                                                 
8 Internal functioning of RCN by Barend van der Meulen, University of Twente and James 
Stroyan, Technopolis, Background report No 8 in the evaluation of the Research Council of Norway. 
Published byUniversity of Twente and Technopolis [online] URL:http://odin.dep.no/ufd/norsk/forskning-
old/tema/014021-990023/index-dok000-b-n-a.html#Bakgrunnsrapporter 
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Furthermore, there remained a political will to ensure that all ‘parties’ within the research 
community are fully represented. This political imperative means that RCN must support, and 
be seen to be supporting, all scientific disciplines and industrial sectors. In some cases, the 
Council also strived to maintain an appropriate balance in terms of demographic 
considerations, ensuring that geographical regions, peoples and genders are adequately 
represented. 
 
The evaluators noted that RCN has not been able to overcome the constraints imposed by high 
levels of fragmentation both upstream and downstream, and the requirement to function in a 
largely ‘non-discriminatory’ fashion. These constraints have diluted the extent to which RCN 
can provide a lead in terms of science policy. Moreover, they explain why RCN had difficulty 
translating its own divisional strategies into real actions and achievements, and why attempts 
at effective integration and cooperation across divisional boundaries appear weak. However, 
the authors added that RCN continue to strive to develop and improve the way it functions 
within the limitations imposed by external forces. 
 
Certain aspects of the budgeting process, in particular the situation whereby individual 
research divisions ‘compete’ with each other on an annual basis for additional funding, has 
historically undermined parallel efforts to improve cooperation and coordination within RCN. 
The authors argued that recent moves to improve this situation – through improved ‘top-
down’ direction as to where additional funding should be deployed coupled with explicit 
requests to the Research Divisions to come forward with joint proposals – appear sensible. 
 
Earmarking of research funding for specific research fields is common practice within all 
research funding agencies. However, the Norwegian research funding system appears, at least 
in some cases, to go down to a level of specificity not witnessed elsewhere. Of more concern 
to these evaluators is that earmarking sometimes relates to specific institutes, geographical 
regions, and so on. This can create problems for research administration and cause strategic 
and quality considerations to be disrupted by political concerns. 
 
Programme areas and allocations tend to follow historical, sectoral lines, and are only weakly 
related to the current strategies or research policies. Programme definition and 
implementation procedures do not vary by ‘type’ of programme, but rather according to the 
personal preferences of the responsible Research Division or programme board. Whilst there 
is scope for employing a range of different processes in the ways in which programmes and 
other categories of funding are managed, such processes should vary according to the nature 
of the initiative, not the personal preferences of those who operate them. The authors argue 
this aspect of RCN’s functioning urgently requires overhaul and rationalization. Clearly 
defined appraisal and selection procedures, optimised according to the defining features of the 
programme to which they relate would help to reduce administrative complexity and improve 
transparency of decision-making processes. 
 
Programme planning strategies and processes vary by Division, with little logical structure 
behind such differences. There is scope for improved utilization of standard programme 
planning tools that have good precedence in other national research councils, the reviewers 
say. There were several initiatives within the Council to improve strategic planning at both the 
divisional and Council levels. Currently, every division seems to follow its own approach, 
although each conducts some consultation with the other divisions. While differences in 
strategies are justified given the differences in the (implicit) missions of the divisions, practice 
implies that there is a risk of diverging strategies. The evaluators point out that this is 
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reinforced because the Strategic Planning Division appears not to be involved in coordinating 
and supporting strategy development at the divisional level.  
 
The evaluators believe there is scope for a more coordinated approach to strategy 
development, involving better sharing of good practices across the organisation. Although 
each of the strategic processes that the divisions developed have some value they also seem to 
rely very much on consultation with the usual bodies and people with whom RCN interacted. 
So, the people that are involved in these processes are also the ones with which RCN 
interacted to run the procedures, especially the ministries and the programme boards.  
 
Opening up the consultative processes to include greater input from international experts and 
competence centres would bring different perspectives and competencies to bear and help to 
strengthen RCN’s strategic planning and functioning. 
 
Evaluation practices are not well developed within RCN, according to these authors. Some 
positive examples exist and a sensible evaluation strategy has been developed but has not 
been fully implemented. Given the vital role played by evaluation in delivering systematic 
feedback and learning, this aspect of RCN’s internal functioning needs urgently to be 
strengthened. 
 
RCN now has prioritised areas - Marine, ICT, Medicine and Health, Energy and Environment 
- which are arguably in need of more concrete and shorter term forms of strategy making and 
implementation, which will require more top-down coordination. 
 
Certain cross-divisional differences remained as the logical consequence of the different roles 
of the Research Divisions in their different sectors. Because of the good working relations 
between staff from the divisions these differences are no longer a significant obstacle for 
RCN to function as one organisation, the evaluators say. However, scope remains for 
improving organisational learning and cross-divisional coordination. 
 
The evaluators have noted clear tensions between the six research divisions and the Strategic 
Planning Division. Some of the Research Divisions seek to avoid and some even undermined 
the request and efforts of the Strategic Planning Division. RCN need to readdress the 
relationship between the Research Divisions and the Strategic Planning Division, if there is to 
be improved coordination and cooperation between these two parties, they add. 
 
The administrative workload carried by RCN was substantial, and it is not clear that the 
human resources available are sufficient (in terms of both number and capability) to carry out 
all of the necessary functions to a high quality. Recent efforts to control administrative load 
by rationalizing the number of programmes (units) to be managed and increasing the average 
size of projects are helpful, but cannot be carried on indefinitely. The evaluators argue that if 
RCN is to continue to face staff cuts, it will have to find ways to supplement its administrative 
resource or reduce its overall workload. 
 
Heavy workloads created additional problems within RCN, which also need to be addressed, 
according to the evaluators. If people struggle to find time to perform all of their day-to-day 
functions, it is difficult to cause them to undertake new or additional tasks, and aspects such 
as training tend to suffer. If RCN is to improve its processes, increase organisational learning, 
and become more strategic and results driven, it will require a certain amount of (additional) 
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time and space in order to do this. Current workloads leave little or no time to develop and 
improve. 
 
 
3.4. Lock in and representation 
RCN is a typical example of an ongoing trend in reforming governance in Norway: the 
tendency to build monolithic structures9.  Such structures may or may not offer co-ordination 
effects. One point to highlight, however, is the lack of diversity in the system, and the 
possibility that innovators become too dependent on one source of funding. This is especially 
the case as Norway has a traditional corporatist structure with representation by interest 
groups on various levels in committees and boards. As we have seen, the committee structure 
of RCN invites representatives from user groups, usually established firms, to serve on these 
committees, and these in turn both formulate objectives and contents of the R&D programmes 
and decide on distribution of support.  
 
The lock-in tendency is illustrated in figure 1, which shows that Norway is in a group with 
distinct characteristics: On the one hand the group consists of those countries that distribute 
disproportionally public support to large firms, even though the majority of firms in Norway 
are small.  On the other hand this group is also consisting of countries with a high level of 
defence related R&D that naturally is channelled through larger defence firms. Hence, 
Norway finds itself in the wrong group, as the other group may be seen to distribute public 
R&D funds over-proportionally to smaller firms.  
 
The political economy of this situation is evident, and is further supported by a recent study 
by Narula (2002). While referring to the representative committee system already described, 
he illustrates that established firms (larger, energy- and or capital intensive firms) are able to 
control the priorities of industrial R&D in the RCN, thereby confirming the tendency to 
exclude smaller, technology-intensive firms which then have to seek R&D funds and 
collaboration abroad.  
 
 
                                                 
9 A recent one is also the merger of three innovation related agencies: The Norwegian Trade Council, The State’s 
Fund for Industrial and Regional Development (SND) and the Norwegian Council for Tourism into one new 
“Innovation Norway”. 
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Figure 1: Share of government financed business R&D, by firm size  
 
 
 
 
Source: (OECD STI Scoreboard 2001, numbers from 1999) 
 
 
 
4. The “new” RCN 
4.1.  Escaping “mission impossible  
 
When discussing the achievements of benefits from the reform, the evaluators noted that the 
framework conditions under which RCN has operated mean that many of the more radical 
ambitions for the reform are simply “mission impossible” (Arnold et. al. 2001: 118 and 39):  
 
“Given the birthday present of a large budget cut, followed by several years of apparent government 
indifference, the organisations locked itself into internal battles and budget struggles.”  
 
“RCN was set up in a period of very active educational reform. (…) In 1993, with the students’ unions 
demanding better grants and the overall government budget under pressure, the government 
reallocated money from research to fund students grants, reducing the budget of the new council. (…) 
the government therefore unknowingly created conditions which would make it very difficult for the 
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vision of an integrated research council to be realised. This birthday present of a 10 % budget cut set 
divisions and ministries against each other in a struggle for resources, reinforcing the very obstacles to 
a more co-ordinated research policy that RCN had been created to overcome.” 
The evaluators noted that the public rhetoric was that of New Public Management, and that 
RCN had enthusiastically embraced many of these ideas including the principle of 
management by objectives. However, at the same time, the Ministries’ interests in research 
are strongly sectorized, and they have a tendency to defend their sectoral interests through 
very detailed micro-management of their research expenditures. Neither the promised money 
nor the required autonomy was granted to RCN. The effectiveness of horizontal co-ordination 
advisory mechanisms and the level of government interest in research and innovation policy 
have been highly dependent upon personalities. 
 
4.2. The new model 
In their conclusion the evaluators made the following comment (Arnold et. al. 2001:120): 
 
“We see two possible conclusions for our work.  One is to say that, if it takes eight years to achieve only 
a modest movement towards an integrated research council, it is unlikely that such a goal will ever be 
achieved. Our other possibility is to say that the experiment is worth doing properly, and to make some 
suggestions about how the next stage could develop. 
 
Although the conclusion of the main report is that RCN should remain one council, the 
authors of the reviews of the Industry and Energy Division (IE)10 think otherwise.  They argue 
that the missions of the RCN should be split up into 
1. A council for funding curiosity-driven research along with some foresight orientated 
strategic research. This should be principally funded by the Ministry of Research and 
Education but it would be appropriate to anticipate funding from the Ministry of 
Health and other Ministries, as long as they are prepared to delegate authority to the 
Research Council and to minimize the amount of earmarking they attach to their 
funding 
2. A funding agency/council for applied and industry-oriented R&D, with the mission to 
foster economic development and wealth creation (largely made up of the current IE 
but which will require strong links to SND and other industry support agencies) 
3. An independent advisory council responsible for formulating research, development 
and Innovation policy in Norway. 
 
An independent and influential research-policy advisory-council could play a vital role in the 
development of national policy in this field, according to these evaluators. The RCN does not 
yet function as a strong advisory body for the development of national policy, and in the 
opinion of the reviewers does not have the independent position, structure or budget it would 
need to fulfil this mission 
 
 
                                                 
10 RCN Divisional Reviews (2001), by Ben Thuriaux and Erik Arnold, Technopolis. Background report No 8 in 
the evaluation of the Research Council of Norway. Published by University of Twente and Technopolis 
[online] URL:http://odin.dep.no/ufd/norsk/forskning-old/tema/014021-990023/index-dok000-b-n-
a.html#Bakgrunnsrapporter 
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 Box 1: Summary of the 2001 evaluation 
 
The evaluators found that the expected benefits from the reform in 1993 were to: 
• Provide the government with an organisation to provide research policy advice, based on a 
holistic, national perspective 
• Increase coordination in Norwegian research by taking responsibility for all fields of research, 
avoiding competition and gaps.  
• Improve integration between basic and applied research 
• Provide a more efficient and un-bureaucratic actor at the research strategy level 
 
The evaluators summarized the tasks of the RCN as follows: 
• RCN shall produce useful national and sectoral research policy, based on an holistic national 
perspective 
• RCN shall fund research to meet social and industrial needs, taking account of user’s needs 
and promoting the uptake of results 
• RCN shall fund the high-quality basic and applied research needed in the national system of 
knowledge production, seeking to integrate the two as far as appropriate while securing the 
place of basic research 
• RCN is tasked with strategic responsibility for the research institute sector in Norway 
• RCN is tasked with promoting the interaction in Norwegian knowledge production with the 
international knowledge production system 
• RCN shall use appropriate and efficient processes (including evaluation) and organisational 
structures in performing its tasks 
 
Some highlights: 
• The amount and quality of policy advice RCN has been able to offer government has 
improved over time. However, RCN could usefully ask more dangerous questions in its 
advisory function, for example about the balance of effort and scale among the different 
actors in the research-performing system. 
• RCN has a set of quality procedures in place, which aim to ensure that it funds research that 
has high scientific quality and that significant parts of its budget are spent on work that is 
socially relevant – both in the short and the long term. A lot of the work it funds is 
fundamental, and there is probably scope to focus this activity more in areas which have 
strategic relevance. Better integration between applied and more fundamental research 
requires more policy experimentation than RCN so far has been able to undertake. 
• RCN was charged with a special strategic responsibility for most of the research institute 
sector, but only to a limited extent given the resources and freedom needed to exercise that 
role.  However, it has achieved increased clarity about funding principles, tidying up the 
system and setting sensible rules. 
• RCN has been very active in setting up bilateral international agreements, few of which have 
much content, according to the evaluation team. However, it has provided financial and 
coaching support to bring the Norwegian research community into the EU programmes. 
Recently, it has started including an international dimension in many of its activities, such as 
PhD funding. 
• RCN operates in a wide range of processes. There is probably more diversity than is actually 
necessary, the evaluators note, and transparency would be served by greater consistency. 
Especially given this diversity, RCN’s administrative costs do not appear excessive. If 
anything, the council is under-staffed. 
• Evaluation is not properly connected to the work of the council. Evaluations have too few 
consequences, according to the report, and are barely linked to organisational learning. 
• The divisions and their boards and the Executive Boards seem somewhat to inhabit parallel 
universes, talking to different groups outside the council and having separate concerns inside. 
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The relationship between the two councils should enable strong cooperation on closely 
selected topics and this will require a mutual understanding of both the research and the 
innovation support traditions. With two well-organized bodies this could be easier to achieve, 
the authors argue, as with the current unified but fragmented RCN seems to be “governed by 
peace treaties and not by a common strategy.” 
 
The Ministry of Education and Research commissioned the evaluation and was therefore 
responsible for following up this work. A Project Governing Board (Styringsgruppe) was led 
by Christian Hambro.  
 
The Government announced on the 28th of May 2002 that the RCN would not be split into 
two or more organisations.  
 
In an article in the Norwegian newspaper Aftenposten11 the Minister of Education and 
Research, Kristin Clemet, underlines the need for a close relationship between basic and 
applied science, which is much easily achieved in one organisation. Moreover, she argues that 
in many areas the present organisation functions well. There is for instance a better co-
ordination of international research co-operation, and a more coherent research institute 
policy. She mentions several issues that will have to be improved, however. Basic science will 
have to be strengthened, the innovation policy functions are to be strengthened and better co-
ordinated, and internal governance and co-ordination must be improved.12
 
On the 10th of September 2002 the Government announced that the RCN would be 
reorganized. Six divisions were to be replaced by three: 
 
• The Division of Science, which is to contribute to the development of basic science 
within all disciplines as well as the development of interdisciplinary research  
• The Division for Innovation is to be a partner for the private and public sector in the 
field of research and innovation. The main focus is on innovation. 
• The Division for Strategic Priorities is to identify and prepare research needs of 
national importance and develop the knowledge base in priority areas. 
 
The Minister of Education and Research said that the Government settled on a functional 
partition (as opposed to a disciplinary one) due to complaints from user groups, especially 
academic researchers and industry representatives. These groups do not face the same needs, 
the minister said. 
 
In the October 2002 National Budget, the Ministry of Education and Research gave more 
detailed presentation of the plans for reorganisation.13 The Ministry underlined that: 
 
• The main board must be strengthened 
• It may be possible for members of the divisional boards to sit in the main board 
                                                 
11 Aftenposten, May 29 2002. 
12 Norwegian press release at http://odin.dep.no/ufd/norsk/aktuelt/pressem/045071-070045/index-dok000-b-n-
a.html 
13 St.prp. nr. 1 (2002-2003) Utdannings- og forskningsdepartementet, pp.19 
http://odin.dep.no/ufd/norsk/publ/stprp/045001-030004/index-hov003-b-n-a.html 
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• The main board will be given the responsibility of reorganizing the institution within 
the framework given by the Government 
• The Research Council will remain an important policy adviser for the Government.  
However, the Government will to a larger extent also ask other parties for advice. 
 
The process regarding the future of the Research Council will have to be considered in 
relation to the development of a new innovation policy and the evaluation of industry policy 
institutions and instruments. 
 
On September 1 2003 the Research Council switched to its new structure, in accordance with 
the reform implemented by the Government.14
 
4.3. The new model – end of governance failures? 
 
The new functional organisational principle might contribute to solve this sectoral 
organisation problem. According to Luther Gulick15 the departmentalization principle chosen 
is central for how the organisation is working. Everything that is to be done in the 
organisation must be analyzed and determined in what group it can be placed without 
violating the principle of homogeneity in each organisational division. Each division must 
either be characterized by: the major purpose it is serving, by the process it is using, by the 
geographical place where the service is rendered or by the persons or things dealt with or 
served. When any of the four items differ, there must be a selection among the items to 
determine which shall be the superior organisation principle. 
 
However, the evaluators emphasized that it was the sectoral organisation culture that was the 
problem; in the historical research councils, in aspects of the budget process in “competing” 
divisions, in programme areas and allocations that tend to follow historical sectoral lines etc.  
 
Hence, it is not the organisational model in itself that is the main problem it is argued, but the 
institutionalized sector-culture in the RCN. Of course, this institutionalized culture is not only 
a problem – this is also important knowledge bases for the RCN’s activity in these different 
fields. But, for a holistic research strategy such a fragmented organisation culture is a 
problem. 
 
There was a debate within the ministries regarding delegating the reorganisation to the RCN 
itself. Some argued for hands off approach, leaving the internal organisation to the people 
who know the needs of the RCN best – i.e. the RCN staff and boards. Others argued that the 
RCN leadership will find it impossible to implement any radical changes, out of the need to 
compromise between the various factors of the organisation. The staff and boards have 
invested interest in the structure, and may find it hard to give up their present positions and 
power. The discussion shows the contrast in an institutionalized knowledge versus an interest 
in a survival of the existing organisation. 
 
 
                                                 
14 See St.prp.nr. 1 2003 and new governing regulations for the Research Council decided by the Cabinet on 
December 20th 2002.  
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Some has however already argued that the reorganisation is only superficial, as most of the 
work units remain the same, manned by the same people. Hence the old cultures live on, 
making it harder to get any real change.  
 
Another topic emerging from the story of RCN is the fact that the process is one of integration 
rather than co-ordination. In other words, merging several research councils into one reflects 
institutional integration, but not necessarily policy-co-ordination. A contrast with the EU 
framework programme may be helpful in demonstrating this point. Over several programmes 
the framework system has tried to integrate various activities into more wholistic approaches. 
For example, the 3rd FP concentrated greatly on technology platforms, integration basic and 
applied research in building knowledge bases for industrial development. The 5th FP 
attempted another focus in using key actions in achieving a more coherent approach to R&D. 
The current 6th FP instigated Integrated Projects (IP) to essentially do the same as the 
technology platforms attempted in the 3rd. Hence, the framework system has been, albeit to 
variable degrees, an instrument to co-ordinate activities through programme design. RCN on 
the contrary has been an institutional solution of sectoral integration to what was at the outset 
labelled co-ordination problems. But RCN as an institution has not been able to co-ordinate 
various R&D activities through e.g. organising basic and applied research in dedicated 
programme design.  
 
Therefore, one may rightfully ask the question of how much institutional integration is 
warranted to ensure proper policy or activity co-ordination? There is no straight forward 
answer to this, but what maximum integration leads to is a lack of capacity in the system for 
self-organisation and adjustment, important co-ordination mechanisms that play a role in 
more loosely coupled, flexible or competitive systems. To high a degree of integration may 
therefore lead to loss of co-ordination, but of course greater political control. There is 
therefore a tentative contradiction in this material, as policy makers delegated policy making 
functions to the research council while at the same time opting for an organisational solution 
that had greater control potential. In sum, we do not see significant effects in policy co-
ordination from these reforms.  
 
Institutionalized cultures are however slow to change, but not static. It is possible to transform 
institutionalized culture through continual processes of interpretation and adaptation16. 
 
 
5. Conclusions: Structure, culture and contradictions 
 
We do not aim at an evaluation of RCN in this paper. The assessment should address some 
key governance issues in the Norwegian innovation policy system, and RCN illustrates these 
rather pointedly. In this concluding section we therefore sum up and discuss these issues as 
they have emerged through the paper. 
 
First, the case of RCN illuminates a political failure in the sense that the policy system is ill 
equipped, both in terms of attention and capabilities, to formulate and address long term R&D 
policy issues. The consequence thereof is two-fold: The political system abdicates from key 
policy challenges while leaving to the RCN to perform such a role. Next, RCN becomes the 
level of co-ordination, as the political level is not able to do this. RCN as an example of the 
                                                 
16 i.e. Olsen 1992 
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agency level in the Norwegian governance system, is then overburdened with co-ordination 
tasks for which it has few resources. The root of this problem, as we see it, may even lie in the 
deeply set sectoral system in the Norwegian public administration, a point that is dealt with 
elsewhere in the MONIT project.  
 
Second, of the two explanatory factors presented for the organisational and co-ordination 
problems in the RCN, the structural and the cultural, we see the structural as the main 
problem. The inbuilt tensions in the organisation, reflecting a diverse set of expectations from 
a complex environment, stretched the council in many directions, giving much leeway to the 
divisional level. Agency level co-ordination in a world that is highly fragmented is indeed a 
mission impossible.  
 
Third, the linkage with the outside world, or rather the constituency, through extensive user 
representation in boards and not least programme committees, may have a great number of 
advantages. But the history also illustrates that it may extend the conflictual interface with the 
user community as well as with the science community. This has in particular been the case in 
several conflicts relating to funding decisions, where people serving on programme 
committees are part of the decision making process concerning funding of projects by their 
own competitors. These governance dilemmas have not yet found their solution, but an 
independent study is being conducted with the aim to recommend new procedures.    
 
Fourth, the policy process leading of to and beyond the reform to the current reorganisation 
was based on assumptions of governance that were ill-conceived. The idea of a monolithic 
structure being the answer to apparent co-ordination problems seems to be a political 
preference for control rather than diversity. Researchers and innovators in the Norwegian 
system may have got a one-door system to forward their applications, but have lost a diversity 
in which different research and innovation policies may have enriched the funding system and 
priority setting. We conclude at this point that the underlying logic of achieving coherence is 
through bureaucratic, agency-level monoliths, rather than flexible and diverse, even 
competing systems. An interesting implication from this is that a monolithic structure may be 
by far sub-optimal in achieving policy coherence and –co-ordination in an otherwise 
fragmented environment, while agency level flexibility and adaptability may be better of, 
creating the necessary diversity for innovators and researchers to exploit a system in which 
bounded rationalities are better distributed and represent lower risks. 
 
Fifth, and this is a key issue, there is a need to distinguish between integration and co-
ordination. The story of RCN is not a story about co-ordination as such, but rather sectoral 
integration on an institutional level. Such integration may or may not have co-ordination 
effects. The process, as well as the outcome, was evidently focussed more on developing a 
controllable institution than on achieving dedicated co-ordination impacts. Sectoral or 
institutional integration was more important than research activity co-ordination. 
 
In sum, the story of RCN is one with great and well-meant ambitions, but with many 
weaknesses. It illustrates that the decision making process is weak, in that far more resources 
are deployed for ex-post evaluation of the reform than a thorough ex-ante assessment of the 
status quo as it was. Reforms with vast implications are carried through without a sound 
policy assessment, and represent often a trend in time and personal political ambitions of  
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ministries and other key actors. We do not know how a revised, multiple system of research 
councils would have looked like, but a system of more diversity would not necessarily be 
worse off when it comes to co-ordination and buffering the complex system of interests in the 
environment. 
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